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DEWEY v. REYNOLDS METALS CO.: LABOR
ARBITRATION AND TITLE VII
Robert Dewey, an employee of Reynolds Metals Company, refused
to work Sunday overtime, as required by the collective bargaining
agreement between his union and employer, because his church forbade
Sunday labor. After several recorded offenses, Dewey was fired. Be-
lieving himself a victim of religious discrimination, Dewey filed a
grievance to set in motion the arbitration machinery created by the
collective bargaining agreement. After unsuccessful union attempts to
conciliate, management and union went to arbitration. Finding that
"the agreement does not permit a regular and continuing refusal of all
Sunday work on religious grounds," 1 the arbitrator concluded that
Dewey's discharge was justified and denied the grievance.
Dissatisfied with the arbitrator's adverse decision, Dewey invoked
the procedure of title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964,2 prohibiting
employment discrimination, by filing a charge with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission.3 Having attempted unsuccessfully to
conciliate,4 the EEOC notified Dewey of his right to bring suit under
title VII in a federal district court within the statutory time limit.5
In his complaint Dewey alleged the facts surrounding his con-
tractual grievance and requested reinstatement and back pay for the
violation of his title VII rights. Moving to dismiss the complaint,
Reynolds Metals argued that by pursuing the grievance-arbitration
procedure to finality Dewey had made a binding election of remedies
and was thereby barred from bringing suit under title VII.0 The
district court denied the motion.1 On appeal the Sixth Circuit reversed,
I Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 291 F. Supp. 786, 787 (W.D. Mich. 1968), rev'd,
429 F2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971).
242 U.S.C. §§2000e to e-15 (1964). Section 703(a), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)
(1964), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Section 703(c) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (2) (1964), makes a prohibition similar
to § 703 (a) (2) applicable to unions, while § 703 (c) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (3)
(1964), forbids a union "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this section."
3See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a). The ninety day statute of limitations for such
charges, id. § 2000e-5 (d), was held tolled while the plaintiff attempted private settle-
ment in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a) (1964).
5 See id. § 2000e-5 (e).
6 291 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
7 Id. at 790.
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holding that the suit should have been dismissed because union and
management had agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's decision and
because permitting Dewey recourse from adverse arbitration would
undermine the federal policy of encouraging private settlement of labor
disputes.8
This Comment analyzes the election of remedies doctrine and its
application by the Dewey courts, and suggests that the actual policy
considerations involved do not justify any rule barring federal suits
involving alleged employment discrimination on the ground that arbi-
tration has been invoked or pursued to finality.
I. THE ELECTION OF REMEDIES DOCTRINE
The election of remedies doctrine, rarely invoked unless a party
is attempting to pursue a remedy inconsistent with one already pursued,9
has been variously applied by federal courts in title VII cases.1' The
state courts have spoken more precisely of the rule:
The doctrine of election of remedies is [based] . . . upon the
theory that a party cannot in the assertion of his right occupy
inconsistent positions in relation to the facts which form the
basis of his respective remedies; it is based on the proposition
that, when a party has two remedies proceeding upon opposite
and inconsistent claims of right, the one adopted excludes the
other.'-
In fact, the doctrine does not relate to inconsistent remedies at all.
[It] is not an inconsistency between the remedies themselves
. . . but it means that a certain state of facts relied upon as
the basis of a certain remedy is inconsistent with and repug-
nant to another certain state of facts relied upon as the basis
of another remedy. 2
Thus, in Estate Counseling Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner and Smith, Inc., 3 in which the plaintiff had purchased stock
8429 F2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971). In addition,
the court held that the employer's action did not violate title VII. This Comment,
however, deals only with the election issue.
9 Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 404, 406 (1969).
'o Compare Edwards v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D.
Cal. 1968), and Washington v. Aerojet-General Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal.
1968), with Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967),
rev'd, 416 F2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). In Bowe the court permitted a title VII suit
after arbitration, but held that upon judgment in the district court the employee
must choose between the two remedies. In Hutchings v. United States Industries,
Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970), on the other hand, the Fifth Circuit held that a
title VII suit alleging racial discrimination in job promotion should not have been
dismissed although commenced twenty months after the arbitrator had denied the
employee's grievance.
1 1 McMahon v. McMahon, 122 S.C. 336, 341, 115 S.E. 293, 294-95 (1922).
12 Id.
13 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962).
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through the defendant broker and later refused to pay the margin de-
posit, the Tenth Circuit held that by sending the defendant a "formal
demand for rescission," the plaintiff had elected his remedy and was
barred from later suing for damages for alleged fraud. The court
reasoned that plaintiff had two alternative, inconsistent remedies, be-
cause the damage suit "counts upon the affirmance or validity of the
transaction, [while rescission] repudiates the transaction and counts
upon its invalidity." '1 "[T]he choice of one rejects the other, because
the sale cannot be valid and void at the same time." -1
As the Estate Counseling court demonstrates, the rationale behind
the election doctrine is not a general apprehension that plaintiff will
recover twice,' 6 but a specific refusal to permit plaintiffs to affirm
the existence of one set of facts entitling them to relief and later to
disaffirm that set and assume a contrary set of facts entitling them to
a different remedy.
In the typical grievance-arbitration situation, however, this doc-
trine is inapplicable. In arbitration the employee claims violation of
a contractual right. In a title VII suit he urges that his statutory
right to be free from discrimination has been infringed. That in each
instance he attempts to vindicate a right violated by the same imper-
missible conduct should not invoke the election doctrine, since that doc-
trine rests not on the similarity of the rights asserted, but on incon-
sistent factual allegations and, thus, necessarily exclusive remedies.
Here, by contrast, there is no necessary inference that the two are in-
tended to be alternatively asserted.
The plaintiff employee's rights differ not merely with respect to
the sources by which they are conferred, private agreement and federal
statute, but more fundamentally with respect to the purposes they serve,
the procedures governing their consideration, and the remedies available
for their enforcement in each forum. When the employee claims a
violation of a right conferred by the collective bargaining agreement,
the arbitrator's function is to examine the agreement between union
and management and resolve the dispute in accordance with what he
14 Id. at 531.
'Id., see United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 294-95 (1922):
[P]laintiff in error was entitled either to disaffirm [the sale] and recover
the lands or affirm it and recover damages for the fraud. It could not do both.
Both remedies were appropriate to the facts, but they were inconsistent
since the first was founded upon a disaffirmance and the second upon an
affirmance [of the transaction] ....
ISBut see Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 404, 406 (1969). In Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), the court expressed concern about the
duplicate relief problem, and, on that basis, required an "election . . . after adjudica-
tion so as to preclude .. . [a] windfall to the plaintiffs." Id. at 715. This solution
is unsatisfactory since, as the Bowe court itself recognized, the contract remedy
may be inadequate under the statutory standard and vice versa. Id. Compare Fleming,
Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L. REv. 1199 (1962), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (g) (1964). So long as the two awards taken together give the employee
no more than his just due in terms of both contractual and statutory standards, he
recovers no windfall; to the extent enforcement of both awards is redundant or
duplicative, the court can make adjustment.
ARBITRATION AND TITLE VII
determines to have been their intent.1 7  Although the agreement may
be given meaning by past shop practices I or by an understanding be-
tween the parties not reduced to writing, "his award is legitimate only
so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment." 19 An award "based solely upon the arbitrator's view of the
requirements of enacted legislation . . .would mean that he exceeded
the scope of the submission." 20
Because it serves only this limited purpose, a collective bargaining
agreement may provide no protection against discrimination as such.
In Dewey, for example, employees were required under the contract to
accept Sunday overtime work unless they had a "substantial and
justifiable reason for not working." 2 1 The arbitrator, whose authority
was limited by a clause stating that
[t]he arbitrator shall have authority to interpret this Agree-
ment for the purpose of settling the grievance but he shall
have no authority to add or to detract from or change this
Agreement, 2
had to determine whether Dewey's religious beliefs were a "substantial
and justifiable" excuse under the contract, not whether his title VII
rights had been violated.
Further, even if the arbitrator had decided that a religious belief
does constitute a "substantial and justifiable" reason, any conformity
with title VII standards would be sheer coincidence.
The instinct, self-interest and the training of the arbi-
trator as well as the body of law surrounding his work, all call
out for him to accept that position which will secure the assent
17"Intene' in this context may, of course, mean that the arbitrator effectuates
what the parties would have done had they considered the specific situation. See
Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MicH[. L. R-v. 1
(1958).
IsAs to whether the employer is subject to restrictions not contained in the
collective bargaining agreement, see Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72
HAv. L. REv. 1482, 1499 (1959); Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration
of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 1017, 1026-40 (1961).
Compare, e.g., Fruehauf Trailer Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 372 (1957) (yes), with, e.g.,
National Distillers Products Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 500 (1953) (no).
a39United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960). Courts have differed over whether the arbitrator may consider legal or
public policy. See Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905
(1955), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 351 U.S. 292 (1956). Compare
Avco Corp. v. Preteska, 174 A.2d 684 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1961) (award ordering
reinstatement of gambler vacated as against public policy), with Local 453, Elec.,
Radio & Mach. Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1963) (gambling,
opposite result).
2OUnited Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
21 Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1970).
22Collective Bargaining Agreement between Reynolds Metals Co. and UAW
Local 27, Art. XI, § 2, Step 5, in Supplemental Brief for Appellee, at 8, Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F. 2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
1971]
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of both of [sic] union and management. Union and manage-
ment want him to operate within the framework of contractual
principles which they have established, rather than range over
their relationship with a roving commission to implement
federal legislative policy. 3
A potentially more difficult situation arises when the collective
bargaining agreement itself contains an antidiscrimination clause.24
An arbitrator's decision that the employer has violated a contractual
duty at least as stringent as the duty imposed by title VII, however,
still provides no basis for applying an election doctrine when the
employee later goes to court for an additional remedy. Although his
determination may include consideration of title VII on the theory that
"[s] ince the parties themselves have used title VII of the Act as a
model, Enterprise Wheel teaches that an arbitrator's award which looks
to the Act in . . . resolving the current contract issue is an appropriate
one," ' he will still be bound to interpret the antidiscrimination clause
in light of what the parties intended. Notwithstanding his considera-
tion of title VII and any expertise developed from arbitrating previous
disputes involving antidiscrimination clauses, "[t]he arbitrator does
not necessarily have special training in law-let alone an expertise in
the fast moving complexities of labor and civil rights law." 26 To the
extent, then, that judicial precedents and legal analysis are important,
the federal judge can more adequately protect title VII rights.
Not only does the arbitrator pursue a different and more limited
goal than the federal court, but many procedural safeguards available
to the civil plaintiff, such as discovery and cross-examination of wit-
nesses, may not be available under the collective bargaining agreement.
27
The district court in Dewey noted that
[t]his reasoning is especially justified in this case, where the
employee was not represented by counsel at the arbitration
hearing, although the company was; and where the union did
03Blumrosen, Labor Arbitration, EEOC Conciliation, and Discrimination in
Employment, 24 Ann. J. (n.s.) 88, 94 (1969).
VA See Platt, The Relationship between Arbitration and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 3 GA. L. REv. 398, 400-01 & rm. 16-18 (1969).
25 Id. 402.
26 Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 40, 48 (1969). The arbitrator's role requires many of the qualities
demanded of judges--expertise in analyzing issues, in weighing evidence, and in
interpreting contracts. Judge Hays has, though, suggested that arbitrators have
little expertise. Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019 (1965).
Moreover, he says, "[A] system of adjudication in which the judge [or arbitrator]
depends for his livelihood . . . on pleasing those who hire him to judge is per se a
thoroughly undesirable system." Id. 1035. But see Aaron, Judicial Intervention
in Labor Arbitration, 20 STAN. L. REv. 41, 51 (1967).
2
7 See, e.g., R. SmITH, L. MERRIlFILD, & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND LABOR ARBITRATION 210-13 (1970).
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not file a brief on behalf of the employee though the company
filed a brief on its behalf.'8
Finally, the arbitration process differs from federal court deter-
mination with respect to remedies. Here also the arbitrator takes
his authority to remedy violations from the collective bargaining
agreement." While the arbitrator may have the power to fashion
wide ranging remedies, such as an "injunction" against a work slow-
down,"0 a federal judge implementing title VII will have power beyond
settlement of the contract dispute. The Fifth Circuit, in Local 53,
Heat and Frost Insulators v. Vogler,3 for instance, held that the Act
grants to a district court "a large measure of discretion in modeling its
decree to ensure compliance with the Act . .. ." " "Where necessary
. the District Court was fully empowered to eliminate the present
effects of past discrimination." ' 3 Relief protecting all employees
against discrimination, rather than merely settling a contract grievance,
furthers title VII policy. When permitted to take "the mantel of the
sovereign" 3' as a private attorney general, the plaintiff helps to further
the national policy of eliminating employment discrimination.35 To the
extent that a collective bargaining agreement and the need to resolve
a dispute do not dictate such relief, the employee can hardly be said
to have in arbitration an alternative remedy to title VII. The rights
conferred by title VII and collective bargaining agreements, thus, differ
in their sources, purposes, enforcement procedures, and remedies. There
is no inconsistency in holding such actions mutually complementary
and in such a case the doctrine of election of remedies should have no
application.
II. TITLE VII AND ARBITRATION OF GRIEVANCES
ALLEGING DIsCRIMINATION
Both the district court and the court of appeals in Dewey appear
to have been concerned not with the election of remedies doctrine as
28 291 F. Supp. at 789.
29 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
30 See Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L. RFv. 1199, 1221-22
(1962). Professor Gould feels that "the acceptability of these decisions is attributable
to the fact that they are in accord with the parties' conscious and subconscious ex-.
pectations." Gould, supra note 26, at 48-49.
314407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
82 Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1052-53.
34 Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1968).
35 See Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 311 (5th Cir.
1970) ("proceeding takes on a public character"). One commentator asserted that
"[t]he inner logic and structure of Title VII is directed primarily not to the pro-
tection of private rights but to the protection of the public interest in the elimination
of all discriminatory employment practices." Affeldt, Title VII in the Federal
Courts-Prvate or Public Law, Part I, 14 VILL. L. Rsv. 664, 676 (1969). But cf.
Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights -Act of 1964, 84 HAiv. L. REv. 1109, 1224-25 (1971).
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it is usually applied, but with an "election of forum" problem. The
district court used the terms interchangeably"6 and although the court
of appeals did not mention election of remedies, Circuit Judge Combs,
dissenting, rejected the choice put the plaintiff calling it an application
of the election of remedies doctrine.37  Perhaps not content to rest on
their decisions on the applicability of the election of remedies doctrine,
both Dewey courts found policy reasons to support their opposing
results. Each court, thus, implicitly recognized that the election issue
in title VII cases is finally resolved in terms of policy-here federal
policy, because the choice to be made involves a clash not between
federal intervention and private settlement, but between federal civil
rights policy and federal labor policy.
In the labor relations field, the arbitrator's role is extremely im-
portant. The Steelworker's Trilogy" expressed the federal policy of
granting the arbitrator a maximum role as a means of maintaining
industrial peace. "Arbitration is the means of solving the unfore-
seeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems which
may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will gen-
erally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties." '9
To achieve this end, judicial review of an arbitrator's decision is
limited.4'
Eliminating job discrimination is also a national policy. In title
VII, Congress created a statutory right and remedy separate and dis-
tinct from any conferred by private agreement. 4 When an employee
brings a title VII suit, alleging a violation of his federal statutory
right, he is "vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority." '
The Dewey district court, while misconstruing the election doc-
trine,43 rejected the employer's argument for policy reasons rather than
the substantive inapplicability of the doctrine:
To hold otherwise would be to require the employee to have
come to this court without attempting a settlement through
3 6 See 291 F. Supp. at 788.
37 429 F.2d at 334.
38 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
39 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Corp., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960).
40 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
41 Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970) ; see King
v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Reese v. Atlantic Steel
Co., 282 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ga. 1967) ; Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 404, 407 (1969).
42 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). While
the Court was referring to title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a to a-6 (1964), its logic was applied to title VII in Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
43 "The doctrine . . . has been traditionally applied in cases where the same
or nearly identical issues were being pursued in two forums." 291 F. Supp. at 788.
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the contractual processes, as preferred by the national labor
law. Plaintiff would also have been required to choose be-
tween two different remedies when both remedies are provided
to insure that plaintiff's contractual, statutory and constitu-
tional rights are protected."
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit based its reversal on policy grounds.
First, concerned with the unilateral relief of title VII, the court found
that because the parties had given their "consent" to arbitration, the
arbitrator had a "right" to finally determine the grievance based on
alleged discrimination.45 Secondly, the court found policy justification
in the effects federal relief would otherwise have on the arbitral process:
[Permitting the employee to sue after arbitration] would
sound the death knell to arbitration of labor disputes ....
Employers would not be inclined to agree to arbitration
clauses . . . if they provide only a one-way street, i.e., that
the awards are binding on them but not on their employees.46
Finally, the court found no "national policy" favoring the opposite
result.
4 7
Thus, the district court and the court of appeals in Dewey dis-
agreed not so much on the substantive applicability of a legal doctrine,
as on policy considerations: the effect which a title VII suit would
have on the arbitral process and national labor policy. The Sixth
Circuit's analysis is not persuasive.
The first objection of the court of appeals arose from its concern
for the employer's plight as the only party bound by arbitration.48  The
court based its argument on two complementary premises: (a) the
employer, but not the employee, would be bound by arbitration; and
(b) the employee could, thus, force the employer to defend the same
action twice.49
Although an appeal to fairness,50 the first premise is unpersuasive.
The notion appears to be that in the absence of mandatory election,
441d. at 789.
15 429 F.2d at 332.
46Id.
471Id.
481d. at 332, 337.
49 These are separate considerations when the arbitrator has not yet decided the
grievance. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 366-67 (S.D. Ind.
1967), rev'd, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
ZOAny appeal to fairness must also recognize that forcing an election, although
eliminating apparent unfairness to the employer, may be unfair to the employees
whom Congress sought to protect under title VII. Under the doctrine of Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the union has wide control over the processing and
settlement of employee grievances subject only to the duty of fair representation.
Since the employee may on impulse use the more familiar grievance machinery and
place the care of his rights in the union's custody, if later dissatisfied with the
union's treatment of his grievance, he will be barred from enforcing his title VII
rights in court. This unfairness would naturally follow from a combination of Vaca
and Dewey. See Gould, supra note 26, at 56.
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the employee will be permitted to "appeal" from arbitration adverse
to him, while the employer will be bound subject to a limited right to
appeal from the arbitrator's decision as violative of the contract.5"
This argument ignores the fact that the employee is not "appealing"
the arbitrator's decision, but is pursuing a judicially enforced remedy
for violation of his statutory right."2 Any apparent unfairness to the
employer should be irrelevant, since Congress did not choose to give
the employer this statutory remedy.
3
The other premise of the argument, that the employer must defend
the same action twice, is also unpersuasive. If Congress intended title
VII to provide a separate and distinct right and remedy, it must
equally have assumed that a national policy of eliminating job dis-
crimination is worth the price the employer must pay in terms of
inconvenience. The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board to hear unfair labor practice charges arising from incidents
concurrently the subject of grievance arbitration has been claimed
equally burdensome.54 But while the Board has what might be called
a specific exemption from the election doctrine,5 the employer is not
unduly inconvenienced by double prosecution, and the courts have held
in this situation that two specific rights are involved. 6
Supporting this refusal to provide a title VII "appeal" to the
employee alone, the Dewey court maintained that the employee is
bound because the union and the employer have consented to arbitra-
tion's "final and binding" effect. 7 But even though the union does
have extensive authority to concede employee rights in return for
employer concessions,58 it has no power to limit the employee's right
to sue under title VII.5 9 To construe the "final and binding" clause
5' Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, §301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). See,
e.g., Torrington Co. v. Local 1645, UAW, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966).
52See note 42 supra; Gould, suepra note 26, at 57.
M Congress could reasonably have found the incidence of employee discrimination
against employers so small as not to warrant a coextensive right.
The concern . . . that the defendant does not enjoy the right to proceed
to court following an adverse ruling by an arbitrator . . . flows from the
fact the employer cannot as a matter of law be the victim of discrimination
by an employee. The law was intended to benefit employees, and, thus, it
is the employee as the alleged discriminatee whom the statute and the courts
have given dual avenues to relief.
Supplemental Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 9 n.2, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
454See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
S5 National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1964).
56United Steelworkers v. American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d 147, 152
(5th Cir. 1964).
57 429 F2d at 332, 337.
_58 See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965).
59 "No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute
an action in any court . . . irrespective of whether or not the labor organization
or its officers are named as defendants. . . ." Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 § 101(a) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (1964). Any union
agreement, enforceable by a court, that the employee will not sue after the arbitrator's
decision limits his title right to bring a federal suit.
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as limiting the employee's right to sue fails to recognize that the union's
consent can only make the arbitrator's decision "final and binding"
on issues arising under the collective bargaining agreement.
The second major objection of the Dewey court, fear that failure
to apply the election of remedies doctrine would damage the incentive to
arbitrate,60 is also baseless. To the employer as well as the employee
arbitration has intrinsic virtues, such as the relatively swift and in-
expensive resolution of disputes. The Sixth Circuit's concern that
employers may attempt to eliminate arbitration clauses altogether 61 is
misplaced. Even if an employer were willing to forego the benefits
of arbitration of title VII claims, he would be unlikely to desire the
elimination of the entire arbitration process, since to him arbitration
remains attractive for settling other disputes.
An employer might, however, attempt to carve out of the arbi-
trator's jurisdiction an exception for title VII grievances. But this
possibility is remote. First, the employer may still desire to arbi-
trate these disputes because settlement satisfactory to both sides may
result and thus save him the expense, adverse publicity, and aggrava-
tion of defending in federal court. More importantly, Congress by
passing title VII clearly established that job discrimination is unlawful.
Even if permitting federal suit discourages arbitration, this does not
justify forcing the employee to choose between forums. Congress
could have attempted to satisfy both policies, encouraging arbitration
and eliminating discrimination, by declaring the national policy against
discrimination and by requiring all labor arbitrators to read into col-
lective bargaining agreements the law of the land. It did not choose
to do so. To give greater weight to the policy of encouraging arbi-
tration at the expense of the statutory policy of eliminating discrimina-
tion is to impute to Congress an intention not revealed in title VII.
On the other hand, permitting federal suit does not necessarily dis-
courage arbitration. It merely places in the hands of the federal
courts the ultimate power to enforce rights if they are not adequately
enforced elsewhere.
From the other side, the employee's incentive to arbitrate griev-
ances alleging job discrimination will not be diminished by permitting
a title VII suit. To the employee arbitration remains attractive-to the
degree it is fair-because it is less formal and costly than a civil suit. If
he does have some preference to arbitrate, as may be instinctual with
many workers, or at least desires to retain his options, the employee
will still grieve promptly to prevent forfeiture of his rights under the
collective bargaining agreement's time limits.62 If permitted to pursue
60 429 F.2d at 332.
61429 F.2d at 332.
62 See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement between Brooklyn Union Gas Co.
and Local 101, TWU, Apr. 1, 1968, Art VII, Grievance Procedure § 1, in CCH LAB.
L. Rq. (Union Contracts-Arbitration) It 59,911, at 85,356: An employee shall cause
his grievance to be submitted to his immediate supervisor within fourteen (14) days
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contractual and statutory remedies simultaneously, the employee still
has an incentive to attempt arbitration, because victory there may enable
him to terminate his title VII suit. Thus, even in the absence of the
election doctrine employees will only gain by trying the arbitration
method of settlement.
On the other hand, applying the election doctrine practically elimi-
nates the employee's incentive to arbitrate. When advised that the
arbitrator's decision will foreclose pursuit of his title VII remedies, he
may conclude that the cost and trouble of instituting a civil suit are
justified by the greater possibility of ultimate success.63 Although he
may bypass arbitration when his chances of winning there on a valid
claim are slight, as for instance when the terms of the contract create
or condone discrimination,64 national labor policy should not give
binding effect to grievances vainly pursued. 5 Moreover, the need for an
independent body to resolve the dispute is most compelling in such a
case because the employee may be protesting a pattern of discrimination
which affronts public standards and national policy to a palpably greater
degree than an isolated discriminatory incident.
CONCLUSION
The election of remedies doctrine, or any doctrine barring an em-
ployee from commencing a title VII suit because of prior or pending
arbitration, should have no effect on an employee's title VII rights and
remedies. First, that doctrine applies only when the employee main-
tains inconsistent positions in pursuit of inconsistent and possibly dupli-
cative remedies. Second, because title VII provides rights and remedies
distinct and in addition to any conferred by private agreement,
"[p]ublic policy requires that the power to remedy unlawful employ-
ment practices not be abdicated to another forum." "6 Third, permitting
an employee to pursue his remedies in court after arbitration is not
likely to damage the national policy of encouraging arbitration, but
forcing an employee to choose between forums may thwart Congress's
policy of eliminating job discrimination.
after occurrence of the events giving rise to the grievance. Cf. Wallace v. Southern
Pac. Co., 106 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Cal. 1951) (discharged employee who failed
to present grievance within time prescribed in contract forfeits recovery for loss of
employment). Even when the contract does not specify the time within which a
grievance must be filed, a reasonable period becomes the standard. Local 205,
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 172 F. Supp. 53 (D. Mass. 1959).
63 Cf. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 291 F. Supp. 786, 789 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
64 See, e.g., Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th
Cir. 1969) (discriminatory union membership provision); Quarles v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (de facto discrimination).
65 Cf. Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969) (concerted union-
management discrimination), in which the Court articulated an exception to the rule
of Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), which required an employee
to exhaust his contractual remedies before seeking judicial review of his contract
claim. The Court said "the effort to proceed formally with contractual or admin-
istrative remedies would be wholly futile." 393 U.S. at 330.
66 Gould, supra note 26, at 58.
ARBITRATION AND TITLE VII
Permitting the plaintiff employee to pursue both arbitration and
federal suit simultaneously only until one is completed "' is unsatisfac-
tory, because the employee may have no control over timing these de-
cisions and cannot weigh the adequacy of either award until a decision
is announced."' Although this problem can be overcome by allowing
the plaintiff to pursue both proceedings to completion, the one court
adopting this policy has, in addition, forced the employee to choose be-
tween the awards granted. 9 When the arbitrator has found discrimi-
nation and has made an award, the employee should not be forced to
choose between what may be complementary awards; instead, each
award should be tailored to the purpose for which it is intended and the
later decision should eliminate any duplication.
The correct disposition would permit the employee to institute a
title VII suit at any time. Such disposition will further both national
goals involved-the use of arbitration to settle labor disputes and the
effective elimination of job discrimination.
67 Washington v. Aerojet-General Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
68 Gould, mipra note 26, at 58.69 Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
